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1. Introduction
According to Seymour Martin Lipsets (1959) modernization hypothesis, the level of eco-
nomic development drives the creation and consolidation of democracy. This contrasts with
another approach in political economy which we refer to as the critical junctures hypothesis.
According to this hypothesis, institutional change which a¤ects both economic and political
development is initiated by di¤erences during a certain critical historical juncture.1
The modernization hypothesis has been much more inuential than the critical junctures
hypothesis in social sciences.2 In this paper, we demonstrate that the evidence supporting
the modernization hypothesis is much weaker than the previous work has found. Instead,
we present evidence consistent with the existence and importance of critical junctures.
Most previous work on the determinants of democracy uses cross-sectional regression
analysis to investigate the causal relationship between income and democracy (in particular,
democratic transitions). However, it is important to control for common variables a¤ecting
income and democracy. The simplest way of accomplishing this is to investigate the rela-
tionship between income and democracy in a panel of countries and to control for country
xed e¤ects. Controlling for xed e¤ects is not only a simple and transparent strategy, but is
also in the spirit of the critical junctures hypothesis, since it takes out the e¤ect of constant,
potentially historical, factors.
We show in this paper that once xed e¤ects are introduced into standard regressions
of democracy, the positive relationship between income per capita and both the level of,
and more importantly transitions to and from, democracy disappears.3 More specically,
we nd that high levels of income per capita do not promote transitions to democracy from
1This hypothesis is exemplied by Barrington Moores famous (1966) thesis that the reasons why Britain
moved gradually to democracy, Germany to fascism, and Russia to communist revolution are to be found
in the di¤erential organization of agriculture and the di¤erential intensities of feudal legacies. Other stud-
ies which share a similar methodological approach include Engerman and Sokolo¤ (1997) and Acemoglu,
Johnson, and Robinson (2001,2002), among others.
2Also see, among others, Londregan and Poole (1996), Przeworski and Limongi (1997), Barro (1999),
Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub, and Limongi (2000), and Papaioannou and Siourounis (2006).
3For similar results focusing on the relationship between income and the level of democracy, see Acemoglu,
Johnson, Robinson, and Yared (2008).
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non-democracy, nor do they forestall transitions to non-democracy from democracy. Our
ndings are robust across di¤erent measures of democracy, the use of additional covariates,
econometric specications and estimation techniques. They hold not only in the most-
commonly used sample period of 1960-2000; we show that they also hold for a balanced
sample during the period 1875-2000.
In addition to linear specications, we develop and implement a double hazard model for
the simultaneous estimation of transitions to democracy and transitions away from democ-
racy. Though the study of transitions to and away from democracy is of important interest,
the econometrics of transition models is not entirely straightforward. Specically, one cannot
look at transitions to democracy or away from democracy as separate events because whether
or not an observation is in the at-risk sample is endogenously determined (selected). We
develop a simple framework to deal with this selection issue in the presence of xed e¤ects.
Using this approach, we show that income per capita conditional on the xed e¤ects does
not predict either transitions to democracy or transitions away from democracy.
The nding that income per capita causes transitions to democracy and prevents transi-
tions away from democracy comes only from the cross-sectional variation in the data. Figure
1-4 provide a simple diagrammatic illustration of this point.4 Figures 1 and 2 focus on the
sample of non-democracies in every ve year interval between 1955 and 1990. We observe
which non-democracies experience democratization ve years later. In Figure 1, we group
observations depending on whether log income per capita is above or below the average
log income per capita in the world for the observation year, and we calculate the fraction
of non-democracies in each group which experienced a democratic transition. This gure
corresponds to regressions without controlling for xed e¤ects, and it is consistent with the
idea that non-democracies with high income per capita are more likely to experience democ-
ratization than non-democracies with low income per capita. Figure 2, on the other hand,
provides a visual representation of the patterns once we take out some of the time-invariant
4All gures use the Przeworski index of democracy which categorizes countries as being either a democracy
or a non-democracy.
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omitted variables. To do this, we group observations depending on whether log income per
capita is above or below the average log income per capita for that country between 1955
and 1990.5 In contrast to Figure 1, Figure 2 shows that non-democracies that are richer than
usual are not more likely to experience democratization. Figures 3 and 4 are analogous to
Figures 1 and 2 for the sample of democracies, and in these gures we calculate the fraction
of democracies which experience coups. Like Figure 1, Figure 3 corresponds to regressions
without controlling for xed e¤ects, and it is consistent with the idea that democracies with
low income per capita are more likely to experience coups than democracies with high income
per capita. Figure 4, on the other hand, shows that democracies that are poorer than usual
are not more likely to experience coups. These gures therefore provide a preview of how
the results are likely to change once we control for omitted variables a¤ecting both income
and democracy. This leads us to conclude that the empirical support for and the strong
conclusions drawn from the modernization hypotheses need to be reevaluated.
But if income does not cause democracy, then what does? The fact that including xed
e¤ects removes the correlation between income and democracy suggests that relatively time-
invariant, possibly historical factors are at the root of both the relative prosperity and the
relative democratic experience of some countries. In order to explore this possibility, we
investigate whether the inclusion of historical variables in a pooled cross-sectional regression
removes the statistically signicant association between income and democracy.
We focus on the sample of former European colonies, since for this sample there is a spe-
cic theory of political and economic development related to divergent development paths,
and there is also data related to the determinants of these di¤erent paths during the critical
junctures facing these former colonies (e.g., Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson, 2001, 2002).
The available evidence suggests that the institutional di¤erences created at the critical junc-
ture of European colonization persisted and signicantly contributed to the large di¤erences
in both the form of government and the economic success of these societies. Motivated by
5Both of these values are demeaned from the world average to account for time trends.
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this evidence and reasoning, we add the following historical variables to the pooled cross-
sectional regression: the indigenous population density before colonization, the constraint on
the executive at (or shortly after) independence, and the date of independence. Indigenous
population density before colonization proxies for the initial conditions a¤ecting the colo-
nization strategy and the subsequent development path (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson,
2001, 2002); constraint on the executive at independence is the closest variable we have to a
direct measure of relevant institutions during the colonial period; and date of independence
is another measure of colonization strategy, since non-extractive colonies gained their inde-
pendence typically earlier than the extractive ones. Consistent with the critical junctures
hypothesis, we nd that the inclusion of these three variables signicantly diminishes and
makes insignicant the cross-sectional correlation between income and democracy. This con-
rms that the xed e¤ects are systematically related to historical variables associated with
political and economic divergence in history, and this lends support to the critical junctures
hypothesis.
Our work is most closely related to Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson, and Yared (2008) who
also investigate the relationship between income and democracy.6 Whereas this work focuses
on the e¤ect of income on the level of democracy, the current paper focuses on the e¤ect
of income on transitions to and from democracy using a linear model as well as a double
hazard model which accomodates xed e¤ects. Moreover, the current paper considers and
provides support for the critical junctures hypothesis as an alternative to the modernization
hypothesis by linking the magnitude of the xed e¤ects to historical variables.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2., we discuss the data used. In Section 3., we
show that the introduction of xed e¤ects removes the statistical association between the
level of income and the level of democracy. In Section 4., we show that the introduction of
xed e¤ects in a linear model and in a non-linear double hazard model removes the statistical
association between income and transitions towards and away from democracy. In Section
6Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson, and Yared (2008) also provide a more comprehensive review of the
literature on democratization, and we refer the reader to that paper to avoid repetition.
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5., we conrm the robustness of our results in a longer sample beginning in 1875. In Section
6., we investigate our interpretation of the xed e¤ects regressions. Section 7. concludes.
2. Data and Descriptive Statistics
We follow the existing empirical research in the way we measure democracy. Our rst
measure of democracy is the Freedom House Political Rights Index. This index ranges from
1 to 7, with 7 representing the least amount of political freedom and 1 the most freedom.7
Following Barro (1999), we supplement this index with the related variable from Bollen (1990,
2001) for 1950, 1955, 1960, and 1965. As in Barro (1999), we transform both indices so that
they lie between 0 and 1, with 1 corresponding to the most democratic set of institutions.
The Freedom House index, even when augmented with Bollens data, only enables us to
look at the post-war era. The Polity IV dataset, on the other hand, provides information for
all countries since independence starting in 1800. Both to look at pre-1940 events and as a
check on our main measure, we also use the composite Polity index, which is the di¤erence
between the Politys Democracy and Autocracy indices.8 To facilitate comparison with the
Freedom House score, we also normalize the composite Polity index to lie between 0 and 1.
Both of these measures enable us to distinguish between di¤erent shades of democracy.
An alternative empirical approach has been defended and used by Przeworski et al. (2000)
who argue that a simple dichotomy between democracy and non-democracy is the most
useful empirical denition. Dichotomous measures may also be better suited to analyses
of transitions from and to democracy. Therefore, we present results using the Boix-Rosato
dataset which extends the data of Przeworski et al. (2000) in which the index equals 1 if
a country is a democracy and equals 0 otherwise. We also develop a simple double hazard
model to deal with the simultaneous modeling of transitions to and from democracy. All of
7See Freedom House (2004), http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/freeworld/2003/methodology.htm
8The Polity Democracy Index ranges from 0 to 10 and is derived from coding the competitiveness of
political participation, the openness and competitiveness of executive recruitment, and constraints on the
chief executive. The Polity Autocracy Index also ranges from 0 to 10 and is constructed in a similar way to
the democracy score. See Marshall and Jaggers (2004) and http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity/
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these exercises using the dichotomous measures give very similar results to those using the
continuous measures. We construct ve-yearly and annual panels. For the ve-year panels,
we take the observation every fth year.9
In addition, we use GDP per capita data from the Summers-Heston dataset for the post-
war period (Heston, Summers, and Atten, 2002), GDP per capita data fromMaddison (2003)
for the prewar and long samples, a measure of educational attainment from the Barro-Lee
dataset (average years of schooling for people in the population over the age of 25), and total
population from the World Bank (2002).
When we turn to the former European colonies sample, we obtain the date of indepen-
dence from the CIA World Factbook and the constraint on the executive after independence
from the Polity IV dataset.10 Population density in 1500 is calculated by dividing the his-
torical measures of population from McEvedy and Jones (1975) by the area of arable land
(see Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson, 2002).11
3. Levels of Democracy
We begin by considering the e¤ect of income on the level of democracy by estimating of
the following simple linear regression model:
dit = dit 1 + yit 1 + x0it 1 + t + i + uit; (1)
9We prefer this procedure to averaging the ve-yearly data, since averaging introduces additional serial
correlation, making inference and estimation more di¢ cult. For the Freedom House data which begins in
1972, we follow Barro (1999) and assign the 1972 score to 1970 for the purpose of the ve-year regressions.
Moreover, we assign the 1994 score in the Boix-Rosato data to 1995 for the purpose of the ve-year regressions.
10The data on constraint on the executive from Polity begins in 1800 or at the date of independence. In
our former colonies sample only one country, the United States became independent before 1800 and its date
of independence is coded as 1800.
11Throughout the paper, we adopt the denition of former European colonies used in Acemoglu, Johnson,
and Robinson (2001, 2002), which excludes the Middle Eastern countries that were briey colonized by
European powers during the 20th century. This denition is motivated by our interest in former colonies as
a sample in which the process of institutional development, in particular during the 19th century and earlier,
was shaped by European intervention (see Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson, 2002).
Reevaluating the Modernization Hypothesis 8
where dit is the democracy score of country i in period t. The lagged value of this variable
on the right hand side is included to capture persistence in democracy and also potentially
mean-reverting dynamics. The main variable of interest is yit 1, the lagged value of log
income per capita. The parameter  therefore measures the impact of income per capita on
democracy. Other covariates are captured by the vector x0it 1 with coe¢ cient vector . In
addition, the ts denote a full set of time e¤ects, which capture common shocks to (common
trends in) the democracy score of all countries.12 Importantly, the equation also includes a
full set of country dummies, the is. These country dummies capture any time-invariant
country characteristics that a¤ect the equilibrium level of democracy. vit is an error term,
capturing all other omitted factors, with E (vit) = 0 for all i and t. The sample period is
1960-2000 and time periods correspond to ve-year intervals.13
The most important benet of the xed e¤ect estimator is that, as is well known, if
the is are correlated with yit 1 or xit 1, then pooled OLS estimateswhich are standard
in the literature and exclude i from (1)are biased and inconsistent. In contrast, even if
cov (yit 1; i + uit) 6= 0 (or cov
 
xjit 1; i + uit
 6= 0 where xjit 1 represents the jth component
of the vector xit 1) but cov (yit 1; uit) = cov
 
xjit 1; uit

= 0 for all j, then the xed e¤ects
estimator will be consistent. This structure of correlation is particularly relevant in this
context, because the critical junctures hypothesis suggests precisely the presence of historical
factors a¤ecting both political and economic development.14
Column 1 presents pooled cross-sectional regressions of democracy on income which ex-
clude country xed e¤ects which replicate previous results of the literature. All panels pool
the time-series and cross-sectional variation. All standard errors in the paper are robust
12Throughout the paper, all specications include a full set of time dummies, the ts, since otherwise
regression equations such as (1) capture world-wide trends.
13The fact that the democracy index takes discrete values induces a special type of heteroscedasticity, but
creates no di¢ culty for inference with OLS, as long as standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity
(e.g., Wooldridge, 2002, Section 15.2).
14Nevertheless, there should be no presumption that xed e¤ects regressions will necessarily estimate the
causal e¤ect of income on democracy, for example because there are time varying omitted variables. See
Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson, and Yared (2008) for instrumental variable strategies designed to estimate
the causal e¤ect of income on democracy.
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against arbitrary heteroskedasticity in the variance-covariance matrix, and they allow for
clustering at the country level.15 Panel A of Table 1 uses the Freedom House data, panel B
uses the Polity data, and panel C uses the dichotomous Przeworski index. Lagged democ-
racy is highly signicant and shows a considerable degree of persistence in democracy. Log
GDP per capita is also signicant and illustrates the well-documented positive relationship
between income and democracy. Though highly statistically signicant, the e¤ect of income
is quantitatively small. For example, the coe¢ cient of 0.073 (standard error = 0.010) in
column 1 of panel A implies that a temporary 10 percent increase in GDP per capita is
associated with an increase in the Freedom House score of 0.0073, and a permanent increase
in GDP per capita by 10 percent is associated with an increase in the (steady state) Free-
dom House score of only 0.0073/(1-.703)0.025 (for comparison, the gap between the United
States and Colombia today is 0.5). Overall, column 1 in Table 1 conrms the main nding
of the existing literature of a positive association between income and democracy.
While the earlier literature has typically interpreted this as the causal e¤ect of income on
democracy, column 2 which introduces country xed e¤ects shows that such an interpretation
may not be warranted. In none of the panels is income per capita signicant, and it typically
has a very small coe¢ cient. With the Freedom House data the coe¢ cient in 0.008 (for
example, compared to 0.073 in column 1 of Table 1) with a standard error of 0.034. With
the Polity data in panel B, the estimate is basically zero, -0.003 (standard error=0.038).16
Note that there is an econometric problem involved in the estimation of (1) as we do in
column 2. The regressor dit 1 is mechanically correlated with uis for s < t, so the standard
xed e¤ects estimation is not consistent (e.g., Wooldridge, 2002, chapter 11). However, it
can be shown that the xed e¤ects OLS estimator becomes consistent as the number of time
periods in the sample increases. In columns 3 and 4, we consider estimation strategies to
15Clustering is a simple strategy to correct the standard errors for potential correlation across observations
both over time and within the same time period. See for example Moulton (1986) or Bertrand, Duo, and
Mullainathan (2004).
16We have also investigated whether the lack of a statistical association between income and democracy
once we condition on xed e¤ects is driven by some outliers in the data, and found no major outliers.
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deal with this issue, while in column 5, we use annual data which should reduce the extent
of this bias considerably.
Our rst strategy, adopted in column 3, is to use the Generalized Method-of-Moments
Estimator (GMM) proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991). This builds on the approach
rst suggested by Anderson and Hsiao (1982) and uses second and higher order lags as
instruments under the assumption of no serial correlation in the residual, uit, in equation
(1). With the Arellano-Bonds GMM estimator, the coe¢ cient on income per capita is now
negative in all panels, though also less precisely estimated.
Our second strategy, adopted in column 4, is to use the Griliches-Hausman (1986) long
di¤erence estimator proposed by Hahn, Hausman, and Kuersteiner (2007). This estimator
shares features of the GMM estimator, though it arguably reduces the small sample bias
inherent in the GMM estimation. Again, the coe¢ cient on income per capita is negative in
all panels.
Our third strategy, reproduced in column 5, estimates (1) with xed e¤ects OLS using
annual observations. This is useful since the xed e¤ects OLS estimator becomes consistent
as the number of observations becomes large. With annual observations, we have a reasonably
large time dimension. However, estimating the same model on annual data with a single
lag would induce signicant serial correlation (since our results so far indicate that ve-year
lags of democracy predict changes in democracy). For this reason, we now include ve lags
of both democracy and log GDP per capita in these annual regressions. The table reports
the p value of an F-test for the joint signicance of these variables. The results show no
evidence of a signicant positive e¤ect of income on democracy in any of the panels (while
democracy is strongly predicted by its lags, as was the case in earlier columns).
A potential concern with xed e¤ects regressions is lack of precision due to insu¢ cient
residual variation in right-hand side variables. The results in Table 1 show that this is not
the case in our empirical investigation. The standard errors of the estimates of the e¤ect of
income on democracy are relatively small in most cases, and as a result, two standard error
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bands typically exclude the pooled OLS estimate from column 1 (even though, as discussed
above, these are quantitatively small). For example, although the GMM estimates in column
3 are less precise than the xed e¤ects estimates in column 2, because the coe¢ cient estimates
are negative, two standard error condence intervals exclude the pooled OLS estimate in
panels A and B. The same is true, and more comfortably so, for the Griliches-Hausman
long di¤erence estimator in column 4, which leads to more precisely estimated e¤ects. In
this case, the pooled OLS estimate is outside the two standard error condence intervals
in all specications. This shows that the lack of a positive e¤ect of income per capita on
democracy when we control for time-invariant omitted variables is not driven by imprecise
estimates. Instead, it is likely due to the fact that these omitted variables are responsible
for the positive relationship that previous cross-sectional (or pooled cross-section and time-
series) studies have found.
In columns 5 and 6 of Table 1 we add average years of schooling and population as
additional explanatory variables, and we repeat the regressions reported in columns 2 and
3 with very similar results. In particular, income never has a positive e¤ect on democracy,
and there is also no evidence of a positive relationship between education and democracy.
In regressions not reported here, we also checked for potential nonlinear interactions
between income and other variables, and we found no evidence of such relationships.
Overall, the inclusion of xed e¤ects proxying for time-invariant and country-specic
characteristics removes the entire cross-country correlation between income and democracy
(and education and democracy). These results shed considerable doubt on the conventional
wisdom that income has a strong causal e¤ect on democracy.
4. Transitions to and from Democracy
In the previous section we focused attention on the level of democracy as the dependent
variable. Much of the empirical literature since the work of Przeworski and Limongi (1997)
and Przeworski et al. (2000) has instead focused on estimating separate models for transitions
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to and away from democracy. In this section we investigate whether the ndings in this
literature are robust to the inclusion of xed e¤ects. We rst investigate this question using
a linear model. We then develop and implement a double hazard model for the simultaneous
estimation of transitions to democracy and transitions away from democracy. All of our
various econometric strategies show that once xed a¤ects are included to control for time-
invariant omitted variables simultaneously a¤ecting both income and democracy, there is no
evidence of an e¤ect of income per capita on transitions to or away from democracy.
4.1. Linear Model
Standard analyses of transitions to and from democracy use dichotomous measures such
as the Przeworski/Boix-Rosato data. Here we start with a more straightforward approach
which allows us to also use the continuous democracy scores in the Freedom House and Polity
data. Our strategy is to modify the model in equation (1) as follows:
dit = dit 1 + posIit 1yit 1 + neg (1  Iit 1) yit 1 + x0it 1 + t + i + uit (2)
where Iit 1= f0; 1g is an indicator which equals 1 if dit 1 is below the sample mean and
which equals 1 otherwise.17 This procedure implies that pos represents the e¤ect of income
on democracy conditional on a country starting from a low level of democracy, capturing the
extent to which higher income may promote democratization. Analogously, neg represents
the e¤ect of income on democracy conditional on a country starting from a high level of
democracy, capturing the extent to which higher income may prevent coups.
Table 2 reports estimates of (2), where panel A uses the Freedom House data, panel B
uses the Polity data, and panel C uses the dichotomous Przeworski index. Columns 1-5 of
this table are analogous to columns 1-5 of Table 1 with the only di¤erences being in the
17Although (2) is nonlinear in dit, it is linear in the parameters and in particular, in the xed e¤ects,
the is. This implies that the xed e¤ects can be di¤erenced out to achieve consistent estimation (without
creating an incidental parameters problem).
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addition of the interaction terms for income on the right hand side of the equation.18
In the rst columns of both tables we start with regressions without the xed e¤ects, the
is, to replicate the results of the previous literature in our framework. The results in Table
2 using the pooled OLS approach show that there is a statistically signicant correlation
between income and transitions to and away from democracy with all three types of data.
Our main results, which add xed e¤ects, are presented in column 2. The ndings here
are similar to those reported in Table 1. Once we introduce the xed e¤ects, income per
capita is never signicant for either transitions to or away from democracy. Columns 3 and 4
turn to GMM and long di¤erence estimation of the models with xed e¤ects. The estimates
again show no evidence of an e¤ect of income on either transitions to democracy or away
from democracy. In column 5 we turn to the alternative strategy of using annual data. We
again report the level of signicance of an F-test on the joint signicance of the lags of income
per capita now interacted with the initial level of democracy, and we nd that income per
capita is insignicant in all specications.
The results are thus consistent with those reported in Section 3.. With pooled OLS the
coe¢ cient on income per capita is signicant on transitions to and transitions away from
democracy, but once we add xed e¤ects, income is never signicant in any specication.
4.2. Nonlinear Model
The linear probability models of transitions to and away from democracy reported so far
are relatively transparent and also ensure consistency under a relatively weak set of assump-
tions (see Wooldridge, 2002, chapter 15.2). In addition, linear probability models allow us to
use standard panel data techniques for consistent estimation in the presence of xed e¤ects
(with large T ) by di¤erencing out the xed e¤ects. Nevertheless, nonlinear models may be
more appropriate for understanding transitions to and away from democracy. The di¢ culty
with nonlinear models lies in the fact that because the conditional mean function in such
18Analogous columns to columns 6 and 7 from Table 1 yield similar results and are available upon request.
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models is not linear in the parameters, consistent estimation with xed e¤ects is typically
not possible (see, for example, Wooldridge, 2002, chapter 15.8, and footnote 22).
We begin by developing and estimating a nonlinear double hazard model, which allows for
cross-sectional correlation between income and democracy without introducing xed e¤ects.
This allows us to relate the level of income to transitions to democracy and transitions away
from democracy, without being subject to the same type of biases that pooled OLS estimation
is subject to. Our use of the double hazard model is preferable to existing approaches relying
on probit or duration model analysis since the model takes into account that transitions to
democracy or away from democracy are jointly determined. In other words, transitions to and
from democracy cannot be treated as separate events because whether or not an observation
is in the at-risk sample is endogenously determined (or samples are endogenously selected).
Our contribution here is to develop a framework for dealing with this issue which also allows
the incorporation of xed e¤ects in a straightforward manner.
Our double hazard model can be expressed in terms of two conditional mean functions
for the probability of transitioning to democracy and the probability of remaining in democ-
racy:19
Pr (dit = 1 j dit 1 = 0; yit 1; t) =  (posyit 1 + post ) (3)
Pr (dit = 1 j dit 1 = 1; yit 1; t) =  (negyit 1 + negt ) , (4)
where  is an increasing function with a range between 0 and 1. Equation (3) describes
the probability that a dictatorship collapses (transitions to democracy), and equation (4)
describes the probability that a democracy survives, which is negatively related to the prob-
ability of a coup (transitions away from democracy). Together, these two equations char-
acterize the law of motion of democracy for a given country, so that we can think of these
19Instead of (4), we could have alternatively written Pr (dit = 0 j dit 1 = 1; yit 1; t) =
 (negyit 1 + 
neg
t ), in which case we would have Pr (dit = 1 j dit 1 = 1; yit 1; t) = 1  (negyit 1 + negt ).
While these two specications are econometrically equivalent, the interpretation of the parameters neg and
negt is less intuitive, making us prefer the system of equations given by (3) and (4).
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equations as constituting a double hazard model. The parameters pos and neg represent
the e¤ect of income on positive and negative transitions respectively, and post and 
neg
t rep-
resent the time e¤ects on positive and negative transitions, respectively. Note that equations
(3) and (4) model the appropriate transitions to and away from democracy, but they do not
yet introduce xed country e¤ects.
To make further progress, let us also assume that  () is the normal cumulative distrib-
ution function, so that the system described by (3) and (4) is an exponential double hazard
model. Since this system of equations characterizes the entire motion of democracy, it can
easily be estimated by maximum likelihood.20
Table 3 reports estimates of (3) and (4) using the Przeworski/Boix-Rosato dichotomous
measures of democracy. Column 1 of Table 3 estimates (3) and (4) simultaneously on a
balanced panel and reports the estimates of the marginal e¤ect of lagged income.21 In panel
A, we constrain pos = neg and post = 
neg
t . The estimates show a signicant (cumulative)
e¤ect of income per capita on transitions to and away from democracy. In panel B, we allow
pos 6= neg, while still constraining post = negt . This is useful as a check of whether the
impact of income di¤ers in the two equations as emphasized by Przeworski and Limongi
(1997) and Przeworski et al. (2000). Income per capita is signicant for both transitions
to and transitions away from democracy, though the coe¢ cient on transitions away from
democracy is higher and more signicant, which is in line with the basic nding of these
works. In panel C, we estimate the most exible specication which allows for pos 6= neg
and post 6= negt . The estimates are again similar.
The double hazard model, like all other models that are nonlinear in parameters, cannot
accommodate xed e¤ects. For example, if xed e¤ects are added, the right hand side of
equation (3) changes to  (posyit 1 + 
pos
t + 
pos
i ), and the right hand side of equation (4)
20The likelihood function is straightforward to compute. For example, for a given country i, we
have that Pr fdi1; :::; diT jyi0; :::; yiT 1g = Pr fdiT jdiT 1; yiT 1; Tg  Pr fdiT 1jdiT 2; yiT 2; T   1g ::: 
Pr fdi1jdi0; yi0; 1g.
21We focus on a balanced panel. Our results do not change if we instead modify the exercise to consider
an unbalanced panel. Details available upon request.
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changes to  (negyit 1 + 
neg
t + 
neg
i ), where the is are the xed e¤ects for observation i.
This specication creates an incidental parameters problem in the estimation of the is, and
thus by implications, in the estimation of all of the parameters.22
We adopt the solution proposed by Mundlak (1978) and Chamberlain (1980), which
involves imposing a functional form on the is. Specically, Chamberlain (1980) posits that
Pr
 
ji =  j yi1; :::yiT

= 

j + yi
j

, j = pos; neg (5)
where j and 
j
are exogenous parameters, and yi is the average of yi 1 for  = 1; :::; T . The
important assumption is that the component of ji which is uncorrelated with yi will be ran-
dom in that it will not be correlated with dit. As a consequence, we can write (incorporating
the constant term j into the time e¤ects jt)
Pr (dit = 1 j dit 1 = 0; yit 1; t) = 

posyit 1 + 
pos
t + yi
pos

(6)
Pr (dit = 1 j dit 1 = 1; yit 1; t) = 

negyit 1 + 
neg
t + yi
neg

. (7)
Notably, this specication is less exible than including a full set of xed e¤ects, which was
our strategy in the linear models, because it imposes considerable amount of structure on
how unobserved heterogeneity (omitted time-invariant factors) a¤ects democratic transitions.
Consequently, this specication makes it less likely that we will be able to fully control for
the e¤ect of omitted variables simultaneously a¤ecting income and democracy, and thus
more likely that we may still nd a spurious positive e¤ect of income on transitions to and
away from democracy. Nevertheless, column 2 of Table 3 shows that even with this more
restrictive Chamberlain hazard model, there is no e¤ect of income per capita on transitions
to or away from democracy. Once again, in panel A, we constrain pos = neg, post = 
neg
t ,
and 
pos
= 
neg
. In panel B, we allow pos 6= neg but we constrain post = negt and
22In particular, because the number of parameters to be estimated increases at the same rate as the number
of observations in the cross-section, the standard asymptotics do not guarantee consistency. This incidental
parameters problem is avoided in linear models by di¤erencing out the xed e¤ects, so that they do not have
to be estimated. This then ensures consistent estimation of the remaining parameters.
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pos
= 
neg
. In panel C, we allow pos 6= neg, post 6= negt , and pos 6= neg. In all of
these panels, the e¤ect of income per capita is reduced and becomes insignicant. Overall,
there is no evidence that income per capita has a causal e¤ect on transitions to or away
from democracy once we include controls for omitted variables simultaneously a¤ecting the
evolution of income and democracy.
Columns 3 and 4 are analogous to columns 1 and 2 on an annual balanced sample, and
achieve similar results. Column 5 adds lagged population and lagged education to the sample
of columns 1 and 2, where the averages of lagged population and lagged education are used in
the calculation of (5), and again, income per capita has no e¤ect on transitions to democracy
or transitions away from democracy.
All in all, the results in the last two sections show that no matter what estimation
approach one takes, controlling for omitted variables simultaneously a¤ecting income and
democracyeither by including a full set of xed country e¤ects or by using the parameterized
approach of Chamberlain (1980)removes the empirical relationship between income per
capita and democracy.
5. Democracy and Income in the Long Run
We have so far followed much of the existing literature in focusing on the post-war
period, where the democracy and income data are of higher quality. It is also important to
investigate whether the relationship between income and democracy emerges over a longer
period of time to take into account the development experiences of the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries.
Although historical data are typically less reliable, the Polity IV dataset extends back
to the beginning of the nineteenth century for all independent countries, as does the Boix-
Rosato extension of Przeworski et al.s dataset, and Maddison (2003) gives estimates of
income per capita for many countries during this period. We therefore construct a data set
starting from 1875, where we study the data in 25-year intervals in order to maximize the
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cross-section of countries which can be observed. We construct a balanced panel of countries
for which democracy, lagged democracy (calculated 25 years earlier), and lagged income
(calculated 25 years earlier) are available for every 25th year between 1875 and 2000.23 The
result is a sample of 25 countries for the regressions using the Polity measure and a sample
of 30 countries for the regressions using the Przeworski/Boix-Rosato measure.24
In Table 4 we present our xed e¤ects results with this long run panel. The specications
of columns 1-4 in Table 4 are identical to the specications of columns 1-4 of Table 1 over the
long 25 year sample where the dependent variable is the Polity index. In columns 5-8, the
dependent variable is the Przeworski/Boix-Rosato index. The results in this table are very
similar with either measure of democracy. Columns 1 and 5 report the basic pooled OLS
regressions without xed e¤ects. These show the usual ndings since income per capita has
a positive coe¢ cient and is strongly signicant. Columns 2 and 6 then add the xed e¤ects,
and the introduction of xed e¤ects makes income per capita insignicant. In columns 3 and
7, the use of the Arellano-Bond estimator causes income to have the wrong (negative) sign,
and in columns 4 and 8, the use of the long di¤erence estimator also causes income to have
the wrong sign.
In Table 5 we examine whether there is a relationship between transitions to democ-
racy and transitions away from democracy in this long run panel using the dichotomous
Przeworski/Boix-Rosato measure of democracy. We again implement the double hazard
model introduced in Section 4.2.. As before, we estimate the three possible models with dif-
fering degrees of exibility in cross-equation restrictions.25 As in the post-war panel, without
23For reasons of data availability, we assign income per capita in 1820 to 1850, income per capita in 1870 to
1875, and income per capita in 1929 to 1925. All of our results are robust to dropping the 1875 observation
so as to not use the 1850 estimate of income per capita as the value of lagged income. For all observations,
if income per capita is not available for a particular observation, it is estimated at the lowest aggregation
level for which it is available, and the regressions are clustered by the highest aggregation level assigned to
a particular country. We also assign the 1994 Przeworski/Boix-Rosato democracy score to 2000.
24Countries in both samples are Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica,
Denmark, El Salvador, Greece, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Norway, Sweden,
Switzerland, Thailand, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela. The sample with
Przeworski/Boix-Rosato measure additionally includes France, Japan, Peru, Portugal, and Spain.
25Specically, Columns 1 and 2 correspond to the specications of columns 1 and 2 of panel A of Table 3;
columns 3 and 4 correspond to the specications of columns 1 and 2 of panel B of Table 3; and columns 5
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xed e¤ects the e¤ect of income is large and signicant on transitions to democracy and tran-
sitions away from democracy. However, once again when we include xed e¤ects to control
for omitted variables simultaneously a¤ecting the evolution of income and democracy, the
relationship between income per capita and transitions to and away from democracy becomes
insignicant.
The conclusion from this investigation is that the long run historical evolution of countries
is similar to the evolution of countries in the post-1960 sample. Once we control for xed
e¤ects, there is no signicant relationship between income per capita and democracy.
6. Interpreting the Fixed E¤ects Results
In the introduction, we argued that the xed e¤ects results are consistent with the hy-
pothesis that the (long run) political and economic development paths of societies are inti-
mately linked. There is a natural complementarity between political and economic institu-
tions. Economies grow if their economic institutions encourage investment and innovation,
for example, by providing secure property rights and equality before the law; but this can
only happen when those controlling political power (the political elites) are constrained.
We should thus expect democracy to be associated with economic institutions that foster
growth. This reasoning implies that if events at some critical juncture create a divergence in
the political and economic institutions of a set of societies, we may expect these di¤erences
to persist over time; some of these societies may embark on a path to high income and
democracy, while others experience relative stagnation and non-democracy.
Thus, according to this theory, democracy and income evolve jointly. Nevertheless, con-
ditional on a given development path, economic growth does not necessarily lead to democ-
ratization.26 This reasoning suggests that the xed e¤ects estimated in the previous section
should be closely linked to the underlying institutional development paths and to the factors
and 6 correspond to the specications of columns 1 and 2 of panel C of Table 3.
26Similarly, there is no natural presumption that, conditional on a particular development path, a tempo-
rary improvement in the democracy score should lead to higher incomes.
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a¤ecting what type of path a society has followed. We now investigate this question by
seeing whether the presence of historical variables in the pooled cross-sectional regression
can remove the statistical association between income and democracy.
Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001, 2002) document that factors a¤ecting the prof-
itability of di¤erent institutional structures for European colonizers had a major impact on
early institutions and on subsequent political and economic development in former European
colonies. We therefore expect former European colonies with higher indigenous population
density in 1500 to have experienced greater extraction of resources and repression by Euro-
peans, and consequently to be less democratic today. However, population density in 1500
is subject to a large amount of measurement error, and it is only one of the inuences on
the ultimate choice of development path. For example, for various reasons, Europeans opted
for extractive institutions in many areas, such as Brazil, with low population density. A
direct measure of institutions immediately after the end of the colonial period is thus also
useful to gauge the e¤ect of the historical development paths on current outcomes. We
therefore look at the measure of constraint on the executive from the Polity IV dataset right
after independence for each former colony, measured as the average score during the rst
ten years after independence. This is the closest variable we have to a measure of insti-
tutions during colonialism. We normalize this score to a 0 to 1 scale like democracy, with
1 representing the highest constraint on the executive.27 Finally, we also control for the
date of independence. This is useful because constraint on the executive at di¤erent dates
of independence may mean di¤erent things. In addition and potentially more importantly,
countries where Europeans settled and developed secure property rights and more demo-
cratic institutions typically gained their independence earlier than colonies with extractive
institutions. Another important e¤ect of the date of independence on political and economic
development might be that former colonies undergo a relatively lengthy period of instability
27For example, Peru had a constraint on the executive score equal to 0.33, while the United Statess score
was 1 at independence. These numbers are clearly indicative of the institutions that these countries had
within the colonial period itself.
Reevaluating the Modernization Hypothesis 21
after independence, adversely a¤ecting both growth prospects and democracy.28
To explore the nature of the xed e¤ects and the sources of the cross-sectional correlation
between income and democracy in the former colonies sample, we begin by documenting
analogous results to columns 1 and 2 of Table 1 for this sample in columns 1 and 2 of Table
6. They show that the positive and signicant association between income and democracy
present in the pooled cross-sectional regression disappears once xed e¤ects are introduced.
To understand this result, we use two complementary strategies. First, columns 3 and 4
replace the xed e¤ects on the right hand side of (1) with historical, time-invariant country-
specic variables. Column 3 introduces constraint on the executive at independence and
the independence year of a country. The level of democracy is positively associated with
constraint on the executive at independence and negatively associated with independence
year (i.e., younger countries are less democratic). Importantly, the coe¢ cient on income
is reduced, for example from 0.067 in column 1 to 0.030 in column 3 of panel A. Column
4 introduces population density in 1500 to this specication and shows that the coe¢ cient
on population density in 1500 is negative in panels A and B. In panel A, the coe¢ cient on
income becomes 0.017 and is insignicant. These results suggest that our three historical
variables are capturing (and removing) the same cross-sectional correlation between income
and democracy is the xed e¤ects in column 2. Our second strategy for understanding
the xed e¤ect is to directly regress the xed e¤ects from the specication in column 2 on
the three historical variables to highlight the correlation between these xed e¤ects.29 This
regression is reported in column 5 shows a strong correlation between these xed e¤ects and
the historical variables. For example, the R2 is 0.68 in panel A.
Overall, this section has provided evidence that is consistent with our interpretation
of the xed e¤ects results as capturing the impact of time-invariant, historical variables
28If we also use settler mortality, proposed and constructed in Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001),
the results are similar, though the sample is smaller than the one used in Table 6. These results are available
upon request.
29This regression should be interpreted as illustrative, since xed e¤ects in linear models, such as our
specication in column 2, are not estimated consistently for the reasons discussed in footnote 22.
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simultaneously a¤ecting the evolution of income and democracy. It has documented that
various historical variables that proxy for the factors inuencing the subsequent evolution
of institutions in former European colonies are closely related to the xed e¤ects from the
democracy regressions. This pattern is consistent with the general thrust of the critical
junctures hypothesis.
7. Conclusion
There is a general consensus in the empirical literature that the modernization hypothesis
holds and that there is a causal e¤ect of per capita income on democracy. In this paper,
we argue that, though income and democracy are positively correlated, there is no evidence
of a signicant causal e¤ect of income on democracy. Instead, omitted and most probably
historical factors appear to have shaped the divergent political and economic development
paths of various societies, leading to the positive association between economic performance
and democracy. We provide an interpretation of our econometric results by considering the
alternative critical junctures hypothesis and by linking the xed e¤ects to historical variables
in the sample of former European colonies. We nd that the xed e¤ects indeed capture the
impact of historical di¤erences which researchers have shown can account for economic and
institutional divergence.
Our conclusion is that the relationship between income and democracy and the widely-
accepted modernization hypothesis need to be reevaluated, with much greater emphasis on
the underlying factors a¤ecting both variables and the political and economic development
path of societies. Our results should not be interpreted as implying that historical factors
(or time-invariant factors captured by xed e¤ects) are the only or the major determinant of
democracy today. There is a large amount of variability in democracy across countries that is
not explained by our historical variables and also a substantial amount of over-time variability
in the democracy score of a country that still needs to be understood and accounted for.30 For
30In previous working papers, we have shown for example that the experience of an economic crisis is
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example, it remains true that over time there is a general tendency towards greater incomes
and education, and increased political participation across the world. In our regressions,
time e¤ects capture these general (world-wide) tendencies. Our estimates suggest that these
world-level movements in democracy are unlikely to be driven by the causal e¤ect of income
and education on democracy. The causes of these world-wide trends are an interesting area
for future research.
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Annual data
Pooled OLS
Fixed Effects 
OLS
Arellano-Bond 
GMM
Griliches-
Hausman LD
Fixed Effects 
OLS
Fixed Effects 
OLS
Arellano-Bond 
GMM
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A
Democracy t-1 0.703 0.377 0.489 0.636 [0.00] 0.362 0.508
(0.036) (0.052) (0.085) (0.135) (0.056) (0.093)
Log GDP per Capita t-1 0.073 0.008 -0.129 -0.043 [0.33] -0.038 -0.153
(0.010) (0.034) (0.076) (0.046) (0.042) (0.133)
Log Population t-1 -0.019 0.016
(0.083) (0.119)
Education t-1 -0.012 -0.025
(0.019) (0.024)
Observations 955 955 838 103 2896 685 589
Countries 150 150 127 103 148 96 92
R-squared 0.72 0.79 0.93 0.76
Panel B
Democracy t-1 0.748 0.447 0.590 0.920 [0.00] 0.453 0.633
(0.034) (0.063) (0.106) (0.122) (0.068) (0.112)
Log GDP per Capita t-1 0.053 -0.003 -0.351 -0.016 [0.53] -0.006 -0.229
(0.010) (0.038) (0.127) (0.049) (0.044) (0.186)
Log Population t-1 0.160 0.156
(0.081) (0.106)
Education t-1 -0.028 -0.027
(0.021) (0.028)
Observations 856 856 747 92 3705 643 541
Countries 136 136 114 92 134 93 91
R-squared 0.77 0.82 0.96 0.80
Panel C
Democracy t-1 0.679 0.318 0.457 0.754 [0.00] 0.293 0.389
(0.046) (0.058) (0.092) (0.198) (0.062) (0.106)
Log GDP per Capita t-1 0.097 0.051 -0.017 -0.040 [0.77] 0.052 0.107
(0.018) (0.055) (0.138) (0.070) (0.088) (0.233)
Log Population t-1 0.066 0.301
(0.144) (0.206)
Education t-1 -0.012 -0.045
(0.045) (0.040)
Observations 862 862 792 110 3720 619 524
Countries 123 123 118 110 119 95 93
R-squared 0.67 0.76 0.92 0.75
Table 1
Fixed Effects Results using Democracy
Dependent Variable is Freedom House Measure of Democracy
Dependent Variable is Przeworski Measure of Democracy
Base Sample, 1960-2000
Dependent Variable is Polity Measure of Democracy
5-year data 5-year data
Pooled cross-sectional OLS regression in column 1, with robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. Fixed effects OLS regressions in columns 2, 5, and 6, with 
country dummies and robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. Columns 3 and 7 use GMM of Arellano and Bond (1991), with robust standard errors; in both 
columns we instrument for income using a double lag. In column 4, we use the Griliches-Hausman (1986) long difference estimator with the lagged level of democracy as an 
instrument and with robust standard errors. Year dummies are included in all regressions. Dependent variable is Freedom House Measure of Democracy in panel A; Polity Measure
of Democracy in panel B; and Przeworski Measure of Democracy in panel C. Base sample in columns 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, and 7 is an unbalanced panel, with data at 5-year intervals; the 
sample is 1960-2000 for columns 1, 2, 3, 6, and 7 and 1975-2000 for column 4 where the start date of the panel refers to the dependent variable (i.e., t=1960, so t-1=1955); column 
5 uses annual data from the 1960-2000 unbalanced panel. In column 5, each right hand side variable has five annual lags; we report the p-value from an F-test for the joint 
significance of all 5 lags. See text for data definitions and sources.
Annual data
Pooled OLS
Fixed Effects 
OLS
Arellano-Bond 
GMM
Griliches-
Hausman LD
Fixed Effects 
OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A
Democracy t-1 0.685 0.328 0.466 0.513 [0.00]
(0.062) (0.075) (0.109) (0.370)
Log GDP per Capita t-1 on Transitions to Democracy 0.073 0.008 -0.135 -0.052 [0.35]
(0.010) (0.034) (0.079) (0.051)
Log GDP per Capita t-1 on Transitions away from Democracy 0.074 0.012 -0.133 -0.040 [0.34]
(0.011) (0.034) (0.077) (0.047)
Observations 955 955 838 103 2896
Countries 150 150 127 103 148
R-squared 0.72 0.79 0.93
Panel B
Democracy t-1 0.822 0.550 0.710 1.310 [0.00]
(0.068) (0.107) (0.137) (0.260)
Log GDP per Capita t-1 on Transitions to Democracy 0.055 0.005 -0.320 0.019 [0.54]
(0.011) (0.039) (0.131) (0.056)
Log GDP per Capita t-1 on Transitions away from Democracy 0.048 -0.005 -0.332 -0.028 [0.60]
(0.011) (0.037) (0.128) (0.049)
Observations 856 856 747 92 3705
Countries 136 136 114 92 134
R-squared 0.77 0.82 0.96
Panel C
Democracy t-1 0.102 -0.109 0.803 1.662 [0.00]
(0.347) (0.514) (0.910) (1.350)
Log GDP per Capita t-1 on Transitions to Democracy 0.068 0.031 0.084 0.007 [0.54]
(0.022) (0.056) (0.210) (0.094)
Log GDP per Capita t-1 on Transitions away from Democracy 0.137 0.084 0.037 -0.118 [0.78]
(0.032) (0.072) (0.148) (0.122)
Observations 862 862 792 110 3720
Countries 123 123 118 110 119
R-squared 0.67 0.76 0.92
Table 2
Fixed Effects Results using Transitions to and Away from Democracy
Dependent Variable is Freedom House Measure of Democracy
Dependent Variable is Przeworski Measure of Democracy
Base Sample, 1960-2000
Dependent Variable is Polity Measure of Democracy
5-year data
Columns 1-5 are isomorphic to columns 1-5 of Table 1 with log GDP per Capita t-1 replaced with two interaction terms. Log GDP per Capita t-1 Transitions to Democracy represents log 
GDP per Capitat-1 interacted with a 0/1 dummy which equals 1 only if Democracyt-1 is below the sample mean. Log GDP per Capitat-1 Transitions away from Democracy represents log 
GDP per Capitat-1 interacted with a 0/1 dummy which equals 1 only if Democracyt-1 is above the sample mean. In column 5, each right hand side variable has five annual lags for each 
interaction term; we report the p-value from an F-test for the joint significance of all 5 lags. See text for data definitions and sources.
5-year data
Exponential 
Hazard 
(Pooled)
Exponential 
Hazard 
(Chamberlain 
RE)
Exponential 
Hazard 
(Pooled)
Exponential 
Hazard 
(Chamberlain 
RE)
Exponential 
Hazard 
(Chamberlain 
RE)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Constrained Model
Log GDP per Capita t-1 0.412 0.014 0.397 -0.052 -0.044
(0.047) (0.099) (0.046) (0.095) (0.139)
Log Population t-1 -0.263
(0.277)
Education t-1 0.030
(0.071)
Observations 735 735 3180 3180 588
Countries 105 105 106 106 88
Panel B: Partially Constrained Model
Log GDP per Capita t-1 on Transitions to Democracy 0.180 -0.050 0.080 -0.157 -0.081
(0.039) (0.113) (0.028) (0.089) (0.148)
Log GDP per Capita t-1 on Transitions away from Democracy 0.288 0.056 0.265 0.027 0.017
(0.034) (0.112) (0.026) (0.089) (0.148)
Log Population t-1 0.012
(0.293)
Education t-1 0.018
(0.084)
Observations 735 735 3180 3180 588
Countries 105 105 106 106 88
Panel C: Unonstrained Model
Log GDP per Capita t-1 on Transitions to Democracy 0.147 -0.101 0.085 -0.112 -0.135
(0.049) (0.108) (0.029) (0.077) (0.148)
Log GDP per Capita t-1 on Transitions away from Democracy 0.344 0.341 0.208 -0.010 0.308
(0.089) (0.279) (0.049) (0.099) (0.336)
Log Population t-1 0.017
(0.085)
Education t-1 0.219
(0.349)
Observations 686 686 2062 2062 540
Countries 105 105 106 106 88
Table 3
Hazard Model using Przeworski Measure of Transitions to and away from Democracy
Dependent Variable is Transitions to and away from Democracy
Dependent Variable is Transitions to and away from Democracy
Balanced Panel, 1965-1995
5-year data
Dependent Variable is Transitions to and away from Democracy
Annual data
Pooled exponential hazard model in columns 1 and 3 and random effects exponential hazard model in columns 2, 4, and 5. Coefficients correspond to average marginal effects. 
Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. Year dummies are included in all regressions. Dependent variable is Przeworski Measure of Democracy. Base sample in 
columns 1 and 2 is a balanced panel 1965-1995 with data at 5-year intervals, where the start date of the panel refers to the dependent variable (i.e., t=1965, so t-1=1960). Column 5 is 
the same panel for which population and education data is available. Columns 3 and 4 is a balanced panel 1965-1994 in annual intervals, where the start date of the panel refers to the 
dependent variable (i.e., t=1965, so t-1=1964). In columns 1 and 3, in panel A, the coefficients in equations (3) and (4) are constrained to be identical; in panel B, the coefficient on 
income is allowed to be different; in panel C, the coefficient on income and time effects are allowed to be different. In columns 2, 4, and 5, in panel A, the coefficients in equations 
(6) and (7) are constrained to be identical; in panel B, the coefficient on income is allowed to be different; in panel C, the coefficient on income, time effects, and country fixed effects
are allowed to be different. See text for data definitions and sources and for a detailed discussion of estimation technique.
Pooled OLS
Fixed Effects 
OLS
Arellano-Bond 
GMM
Griliches-
Hausman LD Pooled OLS
Fixed Effects 
OLS
Arellano-Bond 
GMM
Griliches-
Hausman LD
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Democracy t-1 0.487 0.192 0.439 0.924 0.311 0.042 0.215 1.067
(0.085) (0.119) (0.143) (0.211) (0.102) (0.119) (0.143) (0.176)
Log GDP per Capita t-1 0.116 -0.020 -0.495 -0.247 0.259 0.163 -0.692 -0.328
(0.034) (0.093) (0.266) (0.123) (0.048) (0.104) (0.198) (0.157)
Observations 150 150 125 25 180 180 150 30
Countries 25 25 25 25 30 30 30 30
R-squared 0.55 0.65 0.53 0.63
Dependent Variable is Polity Measure of Democracy Dependent Variable is Przeworski Measure of Democracy
Table 4
Fixed Effects Results using Democracy in the Long Run
25-year data
Balanced Panel, 1875-2000
Pooled cross-sectional OLS regression in columns 1 and 5, with robust standard errors clustered by highest level of aggregation for income data in parentheses. Fixed effects OLS regressions in columns 2, 
and 6, with country dummies and robust standard errors clustered by highest level of aggregation for income data in parentheses. Columns 3 and 7 use GMM of Arellano and Bond (1991), with robust 
standard errors; we instrument for income using a double lag. Columns 4 and 8 use the Griliches-Hausman (1986) long difference estimator with the lagged level of democracy as an instrument and with 
robust standard errors. Year dummies are included in all regressions. Dependent variable is Polity Measure of Democracy in columns 1-4 and Przeworski Measure of Democracy in columns 5-8.  Base 
sample is a balanced panel 1875-2000. All columns use 25-year data where the start date of the panel refers to the dependent variable (i.e., t=1875, so t-1=1850). GDP per capita is from Maddison (2003).  
See text for data definitions and sources.
Exponential 
Hazard (Pooled)
Exponential 
Hazard 
(Chamberlain 
RE)
Exponential 
Hazard (Pooled)
Exponential 
Hazard 
(Chamberlain 
RE)
Exponential 
Hazard (Pooled)
Exponential 
Hazard 
(Chamberlain 
RE)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log GDP per Capita t-1 0.612 0.035
(0.082) (0.159)
Log GDP per Capita t-1 on Transitions to Democracy 0.455 0.056 0.508 0.153
(0.066) (0.146) (0.079) (0.177)
Log GDP per Capita t-1 on Transitions away from Democracy 0.509 0.103 0.533 0.206
(0.064) (0.145) (0.082) (0.226)
Observations 180 180 180 180 173 173
Countries 30 30 30 30 30 30
Dependent Variable is Transitions to and away from Democracy
Table 5
Hazard Model using Transitions to and away from Democracy in the Long Run
25-year data
Balanced Panel, 1875-2000
Pooled exponential hazard model in columns 1, 3, and 5, and random effects exponential hazard model in columns 2, 4, and 6. Robust standard errors clustered by highest level of aggregation for 
income data in parentheses. Year dummies are included in all regressions. Dependent variable is Przeworski Measure of Democracy.  Base sample is a balanced panel 1875-2000. All columns use 25-
year data where the start date of the panel refers to the dependent variable (i.e., t=1875, so t-1=1850). In column 1 the coefficients in equations (3) and (4) are constrained to be identical; in column 3, 
the coefficient on income is allowed to be different; in column 5, the coefficient on income and time effects are allowed to be different. In column 2 the coefficients in equations (6) and (7) are 
constrained to be identical; in column 4, the coefficient on income is allowed to be different; in column 6, the coefficient on income, time effects, and country fixed effects are allowed to be different.  
GDP per capita is from Maddison (2003).  See text for data definitions and sources.
Pooled OLS Fixed Effects OLS Pooled OLS Pooled OLS
Cross-Sectional 
OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A
Dependent 
Variable is Fixed 
Effect from (2)
Democracy t-1 0.658 0.286 0.551 0.544
(0.049) (0.058) (0.047) (0.046)
Log GDP per Capita t-1 0.067 -0.071 0.030 0.017
(0.014) (0.039) (0.012) (0.014)
Constraint on the Executive at Independence 0.189 0.195 0.401
(0.030) (0.029) (0.048)
Independence Year/100 -0.102 -0.100 -0.201
(0.015) (0.015) (0.028)
Log Population Density in 1500 -0.014 -0.041
(0.006) (0.011)
Observations 591 591 591 591 80
Countries 80 80 80 80 80
R-squared 0.61 0.71 0.64 0.64 0.68
Panel B
Dependent 
Variable is Fixed 
Effect from (2)
Democracy t-1 0.715 0.352 0.624 0.618
(0.045) (0.068) (0.052) (0.051)
Log GDP per Capita t-1 0.051 -0.043 0.019 0.008
(0.013) (0.044) (0.012) (0.013)
Constraint on the Executive at Independence 0.151 0.157 0.347
(0.038) (0.036) (0.042)
Independence Year/100 -0.089 -0.088 -0.171
(0.016) (0.016) (0.025)
Log Population Density in 1500 -0.011 -0.028
(0.007) (0.009)
Observations 559 559 559 559 80
Countries 80 80 80 80 80
R-squared 0.69 0.76 0.70 0.70 0.66
Panel C
Dependent 
Variable is Fixed 
Effect from (2)
Democracy t-1 0.675 0.281 0.612 0.612
(0.057) (0.072) (0.062) (0.062)
Log GDP per Capita t-1 0.084 0.001 0.037 0.041
(0.022) (0.066) (0.021) (0.023)
Constraint on the Executive at Independence 0.128 0.128 0.307
(0.051) (0.051) (0.070)
Independence Year/100 -0.126 -0.128 -0.269
(0.035) (0.035) (0.040)
Log Population Density in 1500 0.005 -0.004
(0.012) (0.016)
Observations 563 563 563 563 79
Countries 79 79 79 79 79
R-squared 0.58 0.70 0.60 0.60 0.46
Dependent Variable is Freedom House Measure of Democracy
Dependent Variable is Polity Measure of Democracy
Dependent Variable is Przeworski Measure of Democracy
Table 6
Effect of Historical Institutions on Democracy: Former Colonies
Former Colonies Sample, 1960-2000
5-year data
Pooled cross-sectional OLS regression in columns 1, 3, and 4 with robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. Fixed effects OLS regressions in column 2 with country 
dummies and robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. Weighted cross-sectional OLS in column 5. Year dummies are included in columns 1-4. For columns 1-4, 
dependent variable is Freedom House Measure of Democracy in panel A; Polity Measure of Democracy in panel B; and Przeworski Measure of Democracy in panel C. For columns 1-4, 
base sample is an unbalanced panel of former European colonies for which historical variables are available, 1960-2000, with data at 5-year intervals, where the start date of the panel 
refers to the dependent variable (i.e., t=1960, so t-1=1955). For column 5, dependent variable in panels A, B, and C is the country fixed effect calculated column 2 in panels A, B, and C, 
respectively. Weights correspond to the non-robust standard error of the country fixed effect calculated in column 2. See text for data definitions and sources.
Sample includes all countries in five year intervals between 1955 and 1990 which are non-democratic according to the Przeworski Measure of Democracy for which at least two 
observations are available. Observations are grouped depending on whether log income per capita is above or below the average log income per capita in the world for the observation 
year. Each column measures the fraction of observations within each group which experience a transition to democracy five years later. See text for data definitions and sources.
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Figure 1
Sample is the same as in Figure 1. Log income per capita for every observation is demeaned from the average log income per capita in the world for the observation year. Observations 
are grouped depending on whether demeaned log income per capita is above or below the average demeaned log income per capita in the country between 1955 and 1990. Each column 
measures the fraction of observations within each group which experience a transition to democracy five years later. See text for data definitions and sources.
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Figure 2
Sample includes all countries in five year intervals between 1955 and 1990 which are democratic according to the Przeworski Measure of Democracy for which at least two 
observations are available. Observations are grouped depending on whether log income per capita is above or below the average log income per capita in the world for the observation 
year. Each column measures the fraction of observations within each group which experience a transition to non-democracy five years later. See text for data definitions and sources.
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Figure 3
Sample is the same as in Figure 3. Log income per capita for every observation is demeaned from the average log income per capita in the world for the observation year. Observations 
are grouped depending on whether demeaned log income per capita is above or below the average demeaned log income per capita in the country between 1955 and 1990. Each column 
measures the fraction of observations within each group which experience a transition to non-democracy five years later. See text for data definitions and sources.
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Figure 4
